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Congress Stopped Short in Amending the
Law of Venue in Patent Infringement Cases:
VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co.

In 1988, Congress redefined the term "reside" in the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. $ 1391(c),*as it applies to corporate defendants. In VE Holding Corp. u. Johnson Gas Appliance CO.,~
this new definition was applied to a corporate defendant in patent infringement suit by reading the definition into
the patent venue ~ t a t u t eBy
. ~ applying the definition to corporations in patent infringement cases, the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit changed the 100 year-old basis for appropriate venue in patent infringement cases from the jurisdiction
where the defendant resides to where personal jurisdiction may
be ~btained.~
The major argument in favor of applying the new definition t o patent infringement cases is to bring the venue provisions in patent infringement cases "more in line with venue
law generally, as well as with other types of patent litigation.'"
Although the 1988 amendment of the general venue statute as
interpreted in VE Holding did make the law of venue in patent
cases more consistent with venue laws generally, Congress
should have repealed the patent venue statute, thereby placing
all types of patent litigation under the general venue statute.
Because the 1988 amendment to the general venue statute is
expressly limited to corporations, the repeal of the patent venue statute is necessary t o eliminate the inconsistencies that
now exist in patent venue litigation.
Consequently, this note analyzes how venue law in patent
infringement cases has changed as a result of the interpretation given in VE Holding and discusses the practical effects of
1.
28 U.S.C. 8 1391(c) (1988). A corporate defendant is "deemed to reside in
any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the
action is commenced." Id.
2.
917 F.2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991).
3.
28 U.S.C. 8 140000) (1988).
4.
VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1575.
5.
Id. at 1583-84.
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those changes. More specifically, this note examines the inconsistencies and problems resulting from Congress's decision to
make only part of the law of venue in patent cases consistent
with general venue law.6 The note concludes that, in order to
make venue law in patent cases consistent with general venue
law, Congress should repeal the patent venue statute.

Appropriate venue for patent infringement cases, as now
set forth in 28 U.S.C. 5 1400(b),7has remained virtually unchanged for nearly 100 years.8 In Fourco Glass Co. u.
Transmirra Products Corp.: the Supreme Court held that
5 1400(b) was the exclusive venue statute for patent infringement cases.10Under § 1400(b) venue is appropriate in patent
infringement cases when either of two tests is met: (1) the
defendant resides in the judicial district, or ( 2 ) "the defendant
has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and
established place of business."" This section continues t o govern patent infringement cases notwithstanding the general
venue statute codified in 28 U.S.C. 5 1391(c).12
Prior to VE Holding, the term "resides" as applied to a
corporate defendant in the first prong of § 1400(b) meant the
defendant's state of incorporation only.13 At the time Fourco
was decided, 5 1391(c) stated that a "corporation may be sued
in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to
do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall
be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purpose~.'''~ The plaintiffs in Fourco argued that 5 1391(c)
supplemented the provisions in 5 1400(b) and that the defendant could be sued where it was doing business, not just the

6.
Id. at 1584 (stating that the result of the change "is not a result so absurd
that Congress could not possibly have intended it").
7.
28 U.S.C. $ 1400(b) (1988).
8.
VE Holding, 917 F.2d a t 1575.
9.
353 U.S. 222, 229 (1957).
10. See also Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561 (1942) (holding that 28 U.S.C. $ 109 (1940) was the exclusive provision controlling venue in
patent cases). When 28 U.S.C. $ 109 was recodified as 28 U.S.C. $ 1400@) in
1948, no substantial changes were made.
11. 28 U.S.C. $ 1400(b) (1988).
12. Fourco, 353 US. at 229.
13. See VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1578
(Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991).
14. Fourco, 353 U.S. at 223 (quoting 28 U.S.C. $ 1391(c) (1952)).
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state of incorporation.15 The Court, however, rejected this argument and held that 5 1391(c)did not supplement the specific
venue provisions of 5 1400(b).16
After receiving pressure from the bar and the courts,"
Congress amended 5 1391(c) in 1988 and thereby introduced
two significant changes.18 The first change affected how the
general venue statute of 5 1391(c) applies to other sections in
the chapter. Section 1391(c) now begins with the phrase, "For
purposes of venue under this chapter. . . ."lg Because
3 1400(b) is within the same chapter as 5 1391(c), the 1988
amendment applies t o 5 1400(b) as well. The second change
involved the remaining language of 1391(c),which now states
that "a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal
In VE
jurisdiction at the time the action is ~ommenced."~~
Holding2' the Federal Circuit considered the effect of these
two changes on the patent venue provisions in 6 1400(b).
111. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co.
A. The Facts

VE Holding Corporation filed suit in federal district court
in the Northern District of California against Johnson Gas
Appliance Company, alleging "direct and contributory infringement of and inducement to infringe" patents held by VE Holding.22Johnson Gas moved to dismiss the case for improper
venue, arguing it was "an Iowa corporation with no regular and
established place af business" in California, and venue was
therefore not proper under 6 1400(b).~~
The district court held that Johnson Gas did not "reside" in
California as required under the old interpretation of the term
The district court also found that John"reside" in 5 1400(b).~~

15.
Id. at 223-24.
16. Id. at 228-29.
17. For a discussion of the confusion courts encountered interpreting 5 1391(c),
see Robert E. Lee & Co. v. Veatch, 195 F. Supp. 528, 530 (W.D.S.C. 1961), rev'd,
301 F.2d 434 (4th Cir. 1961).
18. VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1578.
19.
28 U.S.C. $ 1391(c) (1988).
20.
Id.
21.
VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1579.
22.
Id. at 1576.
23.
Id.
24.
Id.

1232 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992
son Gas did not have a regular and established place of business in California as required by 8 1400(b), and dismissed the
case for improper venue.25 However, because Johnson Gas
conceded that personal jurisdiction was proper in California,
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and held
that venue was proper in the Northern District of C a l i f ~ r n i a . ~ ~

B. The Court's Reasoning
The Federal Circuit stated that VE Holding was a case of
first impression because the 1988 amendment made $ 1391(c)
applicable to the entire venue chapter, whereas the issue was
open to interpretation when it was last considered in F o u r ~ o . ~ '
Upon examining the statute, the court held that 8 1391(c)
should be applied to 1400(b), reasoning that where the language is clear, the plain meaning of the statute is conclusive." The court found no exceptions to the plain meaning
rule because there was no specific legislative history indicating
that § 1391(c) should not apply to 1400(b),29while evidence
did exist that Congress was aware that the change would apply
to the entire chapter.30
The court also addressed the argument that 5 1400(b)
nullified 9 1391(:c) because $ 1400(b) is a specific statute,
whereas 8 1391(c) is only a general statute. The court concluded that the general statute, 9 1391(c), governed because
§ 1391(c')expressly defines the remainder of the chapter including § 1400(b).31 The court further reasoned that applying
$ 1391(c) to $ 1400(b) would "bring the law of venue in patent

25.
Id.
26.
Id. at 1584.
27.
Id. at 1579. Prior to the 1988 amendment, it was uncertain whether the
two sections should be read together because of 8 1391(c)'s nonspecific language.
However, the section now specifically states, "For purposes of venue under this
chapter . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988).
28.
VE Holding, 917 F.2d a t 1579.
29.
Id. a t 1580. See also Alan B. Rich et al., The Judicial Improvements a n d
Access to Justice Act: New Patent Venue, Mandatory Arbitration and More, 5 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 311, 315-20 (1990) (legislative history indicates that § 1391(c) should
apply to § 1400(b)); Neil A. Smith, Preliminary Injunctions in Patent Practice: A
Tipping of the Scales, in ALI-ABA COURSEOF STUDY,SECURINGAND ENFORCING
PATENTRIGHTS (1990), available in Westlaw, C567 ALI-ABA 397, a t *17.
30.
VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1581-82. See also Rich e t al., supra note 29, a t
317-20 (tracing the amendment in its travels through congressional subcommittees
where explicit language stated the amendment applied to all of Chapter 87, the
venue chapter).
31.
VE Holding, 917 F.2d a t 1580.
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cases more in line with venue law generally,7732
a result the
court characterized as "not. . . so absurd that Congress could
not possibly have intended it."33The court concluded by holding that the first test for venue under § 1400(b)for a corporate
defendant is whether the corporation is subject to personal
jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.34
IV. ANALYSIS
The amendment of 3 1391(c) brought only part of the patent venue statute more in line with venue law generally because the amendment applies only to corporations. The result
of the amendment will be that non-corporate defendants involved in patent litigation will be treated differently for purpose of venue than corporate defendants. In cases involving
corporate defendants, collateral litigation over what constitutes
proper venue will shift to a battle over what constitutes personal jurisdiction. Such a result may be desirable; however, in
cases involving non-corporate defendants, collateral litigat i ~ over
n ~ proper
~
venue will continue. To remedy this problem, Congress should repeal § 1400(b).
In support of the argument to repeal 9 1400(b),this section
will analyze the effects of the new definition of "reside" in the
general venue statute and show the inconsistencies between
the treatment of corporate and non-corporate defendants. The
effects of the change on individual defendants, partnerships,
and corporations in patent litigation will be analyzed by focusing on the breadth of the change in relation t o the old statute
through several examples. Finally, a possible solution to the
issues raised in the analysis will be proposed.

A. Effects on Individuals
The change in § 1391(:c)has no effect on individual defendants because Congress redefined the term "resides" only as it
applies to corporations. Thus, 5 1400(b) is not superfluous and
remains applicable to individuals under Fourco's r e a ~ o n i n g . ~ ~
32. Id. at 1583.
33. Id. at 1584.
34. Id.
35. The court in VE Holding implied that Congress wanted the venue law for
patent infringement cases to become more liberalized. The court never mentioned,'
however, whether Congress understood what effects this could have on collateral
litigation. See id. a t 1582-83.
36. See Appellant's Brief a t 27-28,VE Holding (Nos. 90-1270,90-1274)(noting
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Under 5 1400(b), venue is proper for an individual defendant
where that defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established
place of business.s7 Because the change in 5 1391(c) is limited
t o corporations, the extensive collateral litigations8 regarding
proper venue over individuals will continue.
The amendment of 5 1391(c) also failed to change an inconsistency that exists in venue law for individual defendants in
declaratory judgment actionss9 and patent infringement actions. Unlike a patent infringement action, 5 1400(b) is not
controlling in a declaratory judgment action involving an individual defendant.40The amendment did change this inconsistency with respect t o corporate defendants, but failed to
remedy the problem with individual defendants.
Finally, by exempting individuals from litigating where
corporations are required to litigate, individuals are given an
unfair economic advantage because individuals are not forced
to defend in as many forums as corporations. As one commentator noted, "[Llimiting venue to the forum most convenient to
the alleged infringer is contrary to recent Supreme Court pronouncements on personal jurisdiction, the spirit of which apply
with equal force t o patent venue.'"'

that the district court erred in concluding that a portion of § 1400(b) is superfluous because the change in the definition of "resides" only applies to corporations);
Smith, supra note 29, at *17 (noting that § 1391(c) applies only to corporate defendants and 1400(b) is still applicable to natural persons).
37.
28 U.S.C. 1400(b) (1988).
See VE Holding, 917 F.2d a t 1583 n.19; see also Richard C. Wydick, Venue
38.
in Actions for Patent Infringement, 25 STAN.L. REV.551, 566-85 (1973).
A declaratory judgment action is the mirror image of a suit for patent in39.
fringement. This action is commenced by an alleged infringer to declare a patent is
invalid or not infringed before the patent holder sues for infringement.
See United States Aluminum Corp. v. Kawneer Co., 694 F.2d 193, 195 (9th
40.
Cir. 1982) (holding that for declaratory judgment actions, 1391(c) of the general
venue statute applies rather than § 1400(b)); see also Michael L. Keller & K e ~ e t h
J. N u ~ e n k a m p Patent
,
Law Developments in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit During 1990, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1157, 1193 (1991).
41.
Keller & N u ~ e n k a m p ,supra note 40, a t 1194.
[Wlhere individuals 'purposefully derive benefit' from their interstate adivities, it may well be unfair to allow them to escape having to account in
other States for consequences that arise proximately from such activities;
the Due Process Clause may not readily be wielded as a territorial shield
to avoid interstate obligations that have been voluntarily assumed.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1985) (citation omitted).
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B. Effects on Partnerships
In Injection Research Specialists u. Polaris Industrie~?~
the United States District Court for the District of Colorado
held that partnerships are t o be treated as corporations for
Thus, VE
purposes of venue under 55 1391(c) and 1400(b).~~
Holding may well apply to both partnership and corporate
defendant^.^^ Injection Research gives additional support to
the proposition that non-corporate defendants should not be
treated differently than corporate defendants for purposes of
venue.
C. Effects on Corporations
For corporations involved in patent infringement actions,
the venue requirements are now the same as the general venue
law for corporations; venue is proper where personal jurisdiction can be obtained at the time the action is commenced. In
relation to the old patent venue statute, however, a significant
change has occurred only in the area concerning additional
venue districts. The only additional districts for proper venue
under VE Holding are those districts where the defendant's
contacts with the forum have the necessary nexus for personal
jurisdiction, or where the defendant's contacts can be characterized as continuous and systematic general business contact~.~~
Under Fourco's reasoning, venue was proper in (1) the
state of incorporation, or (2) where the defendant had committed acts of infringement and had a regular and established
place of business.46With the decision in VE Holding, the new
definitioo of "reside" does not alter the second, "regular and
established place of business" test in 1400(:b).However, by
redefining "reside" in 5 1391(c) to allow venue where personal
jurisdiction may be found, the f i s t venue test under 5 1400(b),
as modified by 5 1391(c),has swallowed up the second, "regular

42.
759 F. Supp. 1511 (D. Colo. 1991).
43.
Id. at 1513.
44.
However, this issue has not yet been addressed by the Federal Circuit
which has exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases.
45.
See Plastic Films, Inc. v. Poly Pak Am., Inc., 764 F. Supp. 1238, 1239
(W.D. Mich. 1991).
46.
VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1577-78
(Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991).
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and established place of business" test, because personal jurisdiction is always obtained where the defendant has committed
acts of inffingement and has a regular and established place of
business.47 The second "regular and established place of
business" test in 8 1400(b)is superfluous for corporations.
Thus, proper venue under VE Holding incorporates all
proper venue districts under Fourco and adds one additional
area. This area includes districts where personal jurisdiction
can be obtained outside the state of incorporation or outside of
the forum where the defendant had committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business. To
obtain personal jurisdiction in one of these new districts, the
defendant's contacts with the forum state must be characterized as continuous and systematic general business contacts
(general juri~diction),~'or include a "nexus between the
plaintiffs alleged injury, the production, selling, or use of an
article infringing its patent . . . , and the defendant's con(specific j u r i s d ~ t i o n ) These
. ~ ~ contacts are necessary t o
meet due process consideration^.^^
In short, the results of the amendment are twofold for a
corporation involved in patent litigation. First, collateral litigation over what constitutes proper venue will shift to a battle
See Plastic Films, 764 F. Supp. a t 1241 (holding that there must be a nec47.
essary "nexus between the plaintiff's alleged injury, the production, selling, or use
of an article infringing its patent, see 35 U.S.C. $ 271, and the defendant's conduct*); see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977). The district court in
VE Holding noted that the second "regular and established place of business" test
in $ 1400(b) was superfluous with the amendment of $ 1391(c) because personal
jurisdiction is always obtained if the conditions in the first test of $ 1400(b), as
modified by $1391(c), are met. Appellant's Brief at 27-28, VE Holding (Nos. 901270, 90-1274).
See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984)
48.
(finding that general jurisdiction did not exist where the activities were not regular
and systematic and the action did not arise out of contacts with the state); Perkins
v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (finding general jurisdiction
even though the claims were unrelated to local activities since the defendant's
contacts were characterized as continuous and systematic general business contacts).
49.
Plastic Films, 764 F. Supp. at 1241 (citation omitted).
50.
See Shaffer, 433 U.S.a t 204 (personal jurisdiction exists if the controversy
arises out of, or is related to, defendant's contacts with the forum).
51.
In addition to the constitutional due process requirements, a state long-arm
statute is needed for personal jurisdiction in these cases. For example, in Utah,
statutory authority is obtained in a patent infringement suit by the state's longarm statute authorizing personal jurisdiction over a party that causes a tortious
injury. See In re Traveler's Club Luggage, Inc., 935 F.2d 279 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (unpublished opinion), available in LEXIS & Westlaw databases.
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over personal jurisdiction, while collateral litigation over what
constitutes proper venue will still continue for individuals.
Second, venue choices for a corporate defendant are potentially
greater than for a non-corporate defendant. The shift in collateral litigation creates a disparity between corporate and noncorporate defendants because a corporate defendant must litigate under well-established personal jurisdiction precedent,
while a non-corporate defendant must litigate under the confusing "regular and established business" standard in
5 1400(b).~"ecause of this disparity and because of the increased forums now available to a corporate defendant,
5 1400(b)should be repealed.

D. Examples

A few examples illustrate how venue law in patent infringement cases has changed and how certain inconsistencies
have been produced.
1. Shifting collateral litigation and disparities in potential
forums

a. Hypothetical. A manufacturing company incorporated
in Illinois with its principal place of business in Chicago occasionally purchases replacement parts from a Houston company.
Employees sometimes travel to Houston for training on how to
install these replacement parts. The part is used in a device
that allegedly infringes the plaintiffs patent. The plaintiff lives
in Texas and would like to sue for infringement in Texas. Venue is proper in Texas under International Shoe Co. u. Washingtons3 and its progeny if the plaintiff can show the necessary
nexus between this replacement part, the defendant's contacts
with Texas, and the infringement of the plaintiffs patent.
If, however, this part was not used in the production of the
device that allegedly infringed the plaintiffs patent, then venue
in Texas would be proper only if the plaintiff could obtain general jurisdiction. Thus, the plaintiff would be required to show
that the defendant's business contacts with Texas were continuous and systematic general business contacts.
Under the old interpretation of 5 1400(b), venue would not
be proper in Texas because the company is not incorporated in
52.
53.

See infra part IV.D.3.
326 U.S.310 (1945).
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Texas, and it did not infringe the plaintiffs patent in Texas.
Thus, under the old interpretation of 8 1400(b), the defendant
corporation would probably choose to litigate the venue issue
rather than the jurisdictional question because the defendant
could easily win and would not have t o litigate in Texas. However, with the new statute, the defendant corporation would
now choose to fight the jurisdictional question t o avoid being
required t o defend a suit in Texas.
This example illustrates that in the case of a corporation,
collateral litigation will be centered on personal jurisdiction
rather than on the venue requirements in 5 1400(b),and that
increased venue choices are now available to a corporation
under the amendment.
b. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co. VE
Holding also demonstrates how the focus of a corporate
defendant's collateral litigation over the proper forum shifts
from venue to personal jurisdiction with the new interpretation
of "resides" in 5 1400(b). In VE Holding, Johnson Gas, an Iowa
corporation with no regular and established place of business
in California, was sued in the Northern District of California.
Even though the second prong of § 140qb) requiring the defendant to commit acts of infringement and have a regular and
established place of business was not met, venue was proper
because Johnson Gas admitted personal jurisdiction in California.54However, if Johnson Gas had not conceded personal jurisdiction and if no personal jurisdiction were found, then the
result under the new statute would be identical t o the result
under the old statute. The case would have been dismissed for
improper venue.
If Johnson Gas had not admitted personal jurisdiction,
then VE Holding would have been forced to prove that under
the new statute personal jurisdiction existed in California over
Johnson Gas. Thus, the result of the new statute is to shift the
collateral litigation from determining proper venue to the existence of personal jurisdiction.
is ~an~ example of how
c. Ross v. Tuerk. Ross u. ~ u e r k
the amendment of § 1391(c) may allow a corporate defendant a
greater choice of forums than a non-corporate defendant. In

VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1584 (Fed.
54.
Cir. 1990), c u t . denied, 111 S. Ct 1315 (1991).
923 F.2d 869 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (unpublished opinion), available in LEXIS &
55.
Westlaw databases.
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Tuerk, Ross filed a patent infringement action in the District of
Maryland against a corporation, Aero, and its president, Tuerk.
Venue was not proper for Tuerk under the first test of
5 1400(b) because Tuerk was an individual and not domiciled
in Maryland.56Venue for the corporation would be proper only
if it were subject to personal jurisdiction in Maryland.
Aero was not incorporated in Maryland, nor did it have a
manufacturing or sales office there. Based on these facts, the
Federal Circuit remanded the case to determine whether Aero
Tuerk demonstrates
was subject to personal jurisdi~tion.~?
that in some cases venue may not be proper for the president of
a corporation under 8 1400(b),but may be proper for the corporation under 3 1391(c). Such an inconsistency should be eliminated by repealing 3 1400(b).

2. Limited effects of the amendment

~'
the limited effects
Price v. Code-Alarm, I ~ c .illustrates
of the change in $ 1391(c) because venue in Code-Alarm would
have been proper under either the old or the new interpretation of § 1400(b). In Code-Alarm, Price brought an action in
Illinois against Code-Alarm for contributory infringement of
Price's patent for an automatic burglar alarm.59Code-Alarm,
a Michigan corporation that made and sold security devices for
vehicles, admitted it maintained a continuous and regular place
of business in I l l i n ~ i s .Code-Alarm
~~
had twenty distributor
and retail customers selling Code-Alarm devices in Illin~is.~'
Even though Code-Alarm was argued after the decision in
VE Holding, the defendant asserted that venue was improper
based on the old interpretation of § 1400(b) because it was not
incorporated in Illinois? The court refused to abandon VE
Holding, finding that venue was proper because Code-Alarm
had sufficient contacts in Illinois t o deem it a "resident" of the
state." The court then held that venue was also proper under
the old interpretation of 3 1400(b),because Code-Alarm met the
56.
would
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. Since Tuerk was an individual, Fourco reasoning still applies. Tuerk
have to be domiciled in Maryland to "reside" there.
Id.
No. 91 C 699, 1991 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 9620 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
Id. at *l.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *l.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *7.
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requirements of "the second, 'regular and established place of
business' prong" of the test.64 Because Code-Alarm admitted
to having a continuous and regular presence in I l l i n ~ i sven,~~
ue was proper under either interpretation.
Code-Alarm demonstrates that the effects of the amendment of $ 1391(c) will be somewhat limited because a defendant who meets the requirements for personal jurisdiction will
often meet the requirements of 8 1400(b). Because of the overlap, the existence of $ 1400(b) only serves to create confusion
and it should be repealed.

3. Simplification of collateral litigation
I n re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter
~~
how the new interpretation
Patent ~ i t i g a t i o ndemonstrates
of 8 1400(b) can make a significant difference in determining
proper venue. The defendant in Mahurkar, an Arizona company with its principal place of business in Arizona, was sued in
11linois.~~
Although the defendant had two sales representatives and two technicians in Illinois, it contended that this did
not constitute a " 'regular and established place of business' " in
the state and thus venue was impr0per.6~The district court
declined to decide if the defendant had a "regular and established place of business" in Illinois under the second prong of
$ 1400(b) because, under VE Holding, venue was appropriate.
The court held that the defendant's contacts with Illinois were
enough to give rise to personal jurisdiction."
In Mahurkar, the difficult question of whether the defendant met the second prong of 8 1400(b) was avoided because
personal jurisdiction obviously existed and venue was clearly
proper in Illinois. Even though venue may be proper under
either statute, venue may be more easily proven under
$ 1391(c),~Omaking the provisions of 5 1400(b) unnecessary.

64.
Id.
65.
Id.
66.
750 I?. Supp. 330 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
Id. at 333.
67.
Id.
68.
69.
Id. at 334. The defendant agreed that enough contacts existed for personal
jurisdiction.
See also In re Traveler's Club Luggage, Inc., 935 F.2d 279 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
70.
(unpublished opinion), available. in LEXIS & Westlaw databases (finding venue
proper after determining that there was statutory authority for personal jurisdiction in the state long-arm statute, and that there were sufficient "minimum con-
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Thus, t o simplify collateral litigation for non-corporate defendants, § 1400tb) should be repealed.

E. Possible Effects of Changing the Venue Statute
As several examples have shown, the effects resulting from
the amendment of § 1391(c) may not have been those desired
by Congress. For example, the result of Congress's attempt t o
"bring the law of venue in patent cases more in line with venue
law generally"" may be that collateral litigation involving corporate defendants will merely shift from venue litigation t o
litigation over personal jurisdiction, focusing in some cases on
whether a plaintiff can obtain specific or general personal jurisd i ~ t i o n . ~ Wthe
n other hand, litigation for proper venue involving a non-corporate defendant will often be determined by
whether a "regular and established place of business" exists in
the forum.73
Ironically, a major argument for eliminating the special
venue statute for patent cases is that wasteful collateral litigation over proper venue would be eliminated.74A 1968 American Law Institute study on jurisdiction found:
Any venue statute that produces a large volume of litigation
on where suit may be brought is inherently suspect . . . .
Though a broadening of venue choices increases the opportunities for forum shopping, an activity not unknown in patent
cases, this is not too high a price to pay for having a single
venue rule for federal question cases, and for putting an end
to wasteful litigation about proper venue.?5

This argument remains valid for non-corporate defendants for
whom collateral litigation over proper venue will still continue
under the confusing standard in § 1400(b).

tacts" as required by the Constitution); Farberware Inc. v. Alternative Pioneering
Sys., Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (using new interpretation of
$ 1391(c) to find proper venue after the state's long-arm statute for personal jurisdiction was satisfied).
VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1583 (Fed.
71.
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S . Ct. 1513 (1991).
See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
72.
See also Wydick, supra note 38, at 566-85 (discussing the amount of litiga73.
tion produced in attempting to determine what constitutes a "regular and established place of business").
Keller & Nunnenkamp, supra note 40, a t 1189.
74.
A.L.I., STXJDY OF THE DIVISIONOF JURISDICTION
BETWEENSTATEAND FED75.
ERAL COURTS221 (1969).
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Some may argue that repealing the patent venue statute
would merely shift wasteful collateral litigation from venue to
personal jurisdiction. As noted in VE Holding, "At least until
now, questions of personal jurisdiction rarely arose in simple
patent infringement cases because the venue statute was, comparatively, severely more restrictive concerning districts in
which suit could be brought."76 Even so, the shift from litigation over proper venue to personal jurisdiction may be desirable
because of the prevalent Supreme Court precedent for personal
jurisdiction. This shift may simplify and reduce collateral litigation.

F. Repealing $1400(b)-A Possible Solution
To bring the law of venue in patent cases more in line with
venue law in general, Congress should repeal 8 1400(b).~~
By
repealing $! 1400(b), confusion in the lower courts about how to
apply the decision in VE Holding would be eliminated,78thus
promoting judicial economy. The issue of whether a partnership

76.
VE Holding, 917 F.2d a t 1583 11.20 (citation omitted); see also Ferber v.
Eastern Newsstand Corp., No. 89 CV 1362 (TCP), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16151
(E.D.N.Y. 1990). Ferber was filed before the decision in VE Holding. After the
decision in VE Holding, the court dismissed the case for improper venue. The
defendant had previously waived its objection to personal jurisdiction, evidently
planning to challenge the venue issue under the old 3 1391(c). After VE Holding,
this strategy was fruitless.
See Wydick, supra note 38, at 584 (With the enactment of liberalized gen77.
eral venue laws, the patent venue statute has long since outlived its original purpose. The continued existence of the patent venue statute serves only to prolong
patent litigation and make it more expensive."); see also CHARLESWRIGHTET AL.,
$ 3823, a t 215 (1990), quoted in VE Holding,
FEDERALPRACTICEAM) PROCEDURE
917 F.2d at 1583 (" 'The statute [$ 1400(b)] ought to be repealed, and patent cases
treated in the same fashion as federal question cases generally.' ").
The American Bar Association Section of Patent, Trademark, and Copyright
Law in its annual meeting on August 4, 1990 initially stated it favored the repeal
of 28 U.S.C. 3 140000). This resolution, however, was withdrawn until the Section
of Antitrust Law reviewed i t to see whether there would be any anti-competitive
effects if the statute were repealed. Brian E. Banner, Commitfee Reports to be
Presented a t the Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, 1990 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPY RIG^ L. REP. 19.
78.
See Toombs v. Goss, 768 F. Supp. 62 (W.D.N.Y. 1991). In this case the
court chose to examine whether venue was proper under the second prong of
$ 1400(b) instead of considering whether the defendant was subject to personal
jurisdiction. The court found no "regular and established place of business," and
concluded that venue was not proper. A simpler analysis would consider whether
the defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction. Since the complaint was devoid of any allegations that the defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction,
the court could have decided immediately that venue was not proper.
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should be considered a corporation for purposes of determining
venue would also be eliminated.79Further, non-corporate defeidants would need to meet the same requirements as corporations in patent infringement cases, and in all other civil cases, for purposes of venue. Such a requirement for individual
defendants is desirable in light of the Supreme Court's view
that individuals who benefit from their interstate activities
should be accountable in the areas where they derive their
benefit.80 Further, the inconsistency in venue law involving
declaratory judgment actions and patent infringement cases
would be eliminated for non-corporate defendants." Finally,
repealing $ 1400(b) would not be a drastic change because the
amendment of 8 1391(c) has not greatly expanded the number
of potential forums?'
Even though collateral litigation would still continue over
proper venue, the litigation would be focused on personal jurisdiction and would be essentially the same as for all other civil
cases. Well-established Supreme Court precedent already exists
for personal jurisdiction, which would simplify litigation.
Repealing $ 1400(b) would also allow Congress to clearly
state its intent about the future of patent litigation instead of
having the federal courts try to determine Congress's intent.83
A clear statement of congressional intent will enhance the
ability of courts to make correct decisions and will promote
judicial economy.
At least one commentator has argued that the special patent venue should not be repealed, claiming that a repeal "is unlikely t o strengthen the patent system, is likely to lead to abuses that may add fuel to the anti-patent forces about us, and
will generate more forum shopping and more transfer req u e s t ~ . "This
~ ~ argument against repealing the special venue
statute has now been undermined with the amendment of
$ 139 I ( C ) Also
. ~ ~ the opportunities for forum shopping generat79.
See Price v. Code-Alarm Inc., No. 91 C 699, 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9620
(N.D. Ill. 1991).
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
.
80.
81.
See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
See supra parts IV.C, IV.D.2.
82.
See VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1582
83.
(Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S . Ct. 1315 (1991) (analyzing with difficulty past
congressional intent concerning the restriction or liberalization of patent venue
law).
84.
Neal A. Waldrop, The Patent Venue Statute, 28 U.S.C. 140qb) Should Not
Be Repealed, 4 AM. PAT.L. ASS'N 32, 55 (1976).
Waldrop's main argument for not repealing 5 1400(b) is that the alleged
85.
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ed by a repeal of $ 1400(b) may not be too high a price to pay
to end wasteful collateral l i t i g a t i ~ n Similarly,
.~~
venue transfer requests are more easily resolved than litigating over proper venue because courts may deny transfers if venue is improper in the transferee court or if the convenience of the parties
does not warrant a transfer in the interest of justice.87

By amending the general venue statute as it applies to
corporations, venue law in patent infringement cases has conformed somewhat to venue law in general. The lack of complete
uniformity arises because the statute only applies to corporainfringer has purposely been given a broader range of forums in which to bring a
declaratory judgment action declaring the patent invalid and unenforceable than
the patent holder in an infringement suit. This advantage was given to the alleged
infringer because the patent holder could become oppressive in trying to sue alleged infringers if the patent holder in an infringement action could always obtain
favorable forums in which to litigate. If $ 14006) were repealed, the alleged infringer would lose this advantage. Id. at 50.
This argument is now undermined with the amendment of $ 1391(c) and the
decision in VE Holding because corporations are now treated the same in both
patent infringement cases and declaratory judgment actions for purposes of venue.
The amendment does not affect individuals, so Waldrop's reasoning still applies for
a n individual that is a n alleged infringer involved in a declaratory judgment action.
Even though no inconsistency now exists between the venue requirements for
corporate defendants involved in either a declaratory judgment action or a patent
infringement action, $ 14006) should still be repealed to bring non-corporate defendants on the same footing as corporate defendants. Presently, if an individual defendant is sued for patent infringement, he or she is subject to the venue requirements of $ 140O(b). However, if an individual is sued in a declaratory judgment
action, then the general venue requirements found in $ 1391(c) are controlling. To
eliminate this inconsistency, and to put individual defendants on equal footing with
corporate defendants, $ 1400(b) should be repealed.
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
86.
87.
28 U.S.C. $ 1404(a) (1988); see also Toombs v. Goss, 768 F. Supp. 62, 65
(W.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that a case may only be transferred where it could have
originally been brought); Price v. Code-Alarm, Inc., No. 91 C 699, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9620 a t *8 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (denying a motion to transfer because CodeAlarm failed to show that venue would be proper in the transferee court);
Farberware Inc. v. Alternative Pioneering Sys., Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1079
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (denying defendant's contingent motion to transfer because defendant did not show by clear and convincing evidence that convenience of the parties
warranted a transfer). But see Waldrop, supra note 84, a t 55. Waldrop feels that
saving judicial time is unlikely if $ 1400(b) is repealed. Id. Waldrop also notes that
patent holders usually receive preference in transfer motions which will ultimately
hurt the system because patent holders would be able to sue in more forums favorable to them with the repeal of $ 14006) and have preferential treatment in
venue transfers. Id. at 52. Alleged infringers do not have the same advantage. Id.
a t 53.
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tions and fails to address non-corporate defendants.
Although the amendment of 5 1391(c) brought complete
uniformity with respect t o corporations involved in patent infringement suits, the change is less significant when compared
to the scope of the former patent venue statute as applied to
corporate defendants. New forums for proper venue may now
be obtained wherever personal jurisdiction exists at the commencement of the action. However, because personal jurisdiction was already proper under the old statute in either the
state of incorporation or where the company had a regular and
established place of business, the new amendment does not
drastically increase the number of new forums available.
However, the amendment eliminates wasteful collateral
litigation over what constitutes a "regular and established
place of business." Previously, plaintiffs in many cases were required t o prove a "regular and established place of business" in
order to obtain proper venue over a corporate defendant. Even
though the litigation over venue is eliminated under the new
statute, the collateral litigation will continue in many cases.
Instead of litigation concerning proper venue, litigation will
now shift to a battle over personal jurisdiction, an issue not often previously contested. It is arguable that such a shift may
be an improvement because of well-established Supreme Court
precedent for personal jurisdiction. Even so, problems may still
remain because the amendment only deals with corporations
and lower courts are confused about how t o correctly apply the
statute as required in VE Holding.
As this note suggests, repealing 5 1400(b) would resolve
these problems. All patent cases would be identical to other
civil cases for venue purposes; judicial economy would be promoted because collateral litigation over the proper forum would
be reduced; and lower courts would have clear directions to
follow.

Darin J. Gibby

